Unfair Evictions: Where Fair Housing and Landlord-Tenant Law Intersect by Heeren, Geoffrey
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Articles Faculty Works 
2003 
Unfair Evictions: Where Fair Housing and Landlord-Tenant Law 
Intersect 
Geoffrey Heeren 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Housing Law Commons 
Unfair Evictions: Where Fair Housing




Office of the State
Appellate Defender
203 N. LaSalle St., 24th Floor
Chicago, IL 60601
312 814.5472
Formerly staff attorney, Housing Unit
Sargent Shriver National Center
on Poverty Law
he law that governs the eviction of tenants may vary from state to state, but one
commonality is the summary nature of the process, a feature that often lends
eviction courtrooms the aspect of a Jacobin tribunal. The New York Times
recently summarized the experience of New York City Housing Court, perhaps pro-
totypical of such courtrooms:
With its boisterous atmosphere of lawyers and tenants negotiating in crowd-
ed hallways or barking into cellphones, the housing court can be a desper-
ately bewildering experience. While about 90 percent of the landlords have
lawyers, perhaps only 15 percent of the tenants do. And because the hearings
before the judges, who are among the most overworked in the system, are
typically brief, litigants often have just a few minutes to summarize their
predicaments.1
Legal aid attorneys, having become singularly adept at negotiating these courts, par-
lay a limited arsenal of technical defenses, equitable arguments, and procedural tac-
tics into patchwork victories for clients wholly bereft of other resources. Their
enterprise, however, can often seem sisyphusian-a curse to quash service endlessly
or iterate the argument of waiver, while the housing problems of the poor become
more and more intractable. At the same time, legal aid offices are harried, embat-
tled, and overworked and face a steadily increasing population of clients, declining
!David W Chen, Litigants in Housing Court Fear What State Fees Will Bring, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2003. at 31. See also
Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, Hous. PoLY DEBATE 1 4 4 (forthcoming
2003), available at wwwknowledgeplex org or wwwfanniemaefoundation.org.
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funds, and a Congress periodically con-
trolled by hostile ideologues. 2 Having
become the favorite target of libertarian
or right-wing crusaders, programs in
legal services have a heightened wari-
ness of controversy and increasingly tout
the number of clients that they have
advised and the number of routine cases
litigated instead of setting forth initia-
tives that draw attention to systemic
legal problems faced by the poor.
3
Within this bleak environment, one tool
is understandably often overlooked by
eviction lawyers-federal fair housing
litigation. The Fair Housing
Amendments Act, which prohibits the
denial of "a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin," as
well as handicap, can be a natural
defense in a variety of eviction scenar-
ios.4 Moreover, there may be occasions
where bringing a fair housing suit in
federal court against a landlord intent on
evicting a tenant can be the best if not
the easiest way to protect the tenant. For
those advocates interested in more sys-
temic change, a prominent federal fair
housing suit may be a community organ-
izing tool and a means to focus public
attention on the problems of the poor.5
Imagine, for instance, that a disabled
African American woman-suppose her
name is Ethel-arrives at an intake
interview at a legal services office in a
large city. Say she tells Cecilia, the attor-
ney who interviews her, that she has
lived for the last twelve years in a large
apartment complex, where her rent is
subsidized by a "mainstream" voucher-
a kind of housing subsidy for disabled
persons. 6 The building is in a recently
gentrified neighborhood of skyrocketing
rents.
Suppose Ethel tells Cecilia that last year
the building was sold, and the new owner
has decided to renovate so that he can
better market units to the go -something
white professionals flooding into the
neighborhood. Believing that having
subsidized tenants in the building makes
it less palatable to yuppies, the owner
has adopted a "no Section 8" policy and
has issued "thirty-day" eviction notices
to twelve voucher-holder tenants,
including Ethel, whose leases have
expired. The thirtieth day on Ethel's
notice will pass in a week.
2 0n the current state of legal services offices see BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, STRUGGLING TO MEET THE NEED COMMUNITIES
CONFRONT GAPS IN FEDERAL LEGAL AID 14-15 (2003), On the increasing population of the poor see U.S CENSUS BUREAU,
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2001 1 (2002) (about 1.3 million more people in the United States were poor in 2001 than
in 2000). On declining funds see, e.g., Kylie Greene, Legal Aid Clients Could Be Left Without Counsel, TELEGRAPH HERALD
(Dubuque, Iowa), Feb. 16, 2003, at A17.
3 As an example of legal services' unpopularity with the right wing, a panel of eighteen "conservative publc policy
experts," including former Rep. Dick Armey of Texas, Cato Institute Executive Vice President David Boaz, and former
Delaware Governor Pete DuPont, voted the Legal Services Corporation number one of the "ten most outrageous gov-
ernment programs," See Special Report. Ten Most Outrageous Government Programs, HUMAN EVENTS ONLINE, Mar 10,
2003, at www.humaneventsonline.com
442 U.S.C. § 3601-3619 (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(f) (2003); see Crystal B. Ashley, An Introduction to Fair Housing
Law, in POVERTY LAW MANUAL FOR THE NEW LAWYER 131 (2002)
5See Lucie E White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyerng and Power, 1988 Wis L. REV. 699,
758 (1988). But see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
6The Mainstream Voucher Program is a subset of the Housing Choice Voucher program, under Section 8 of the United
States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2003), and is governed by regulations at 24 C.FR pt 982
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Cecilia knows that housing advocates in
the city have attempted repeatedly and in
vain to pass legislation making it illegal
to deny housing to persons solely
because of their source of income.
Because Cecilia herself lives in the
neighborhood, she knows that Ethel and
the other voucher holders in the build-
ing will have a hard time finding a new
apartment in the area, even with the help
of their vouchers. She checks the evic-
tion notice, finds a technical defect that
she might exploit to get Ethel more time
to move, but realizes that this is not a
true solution. She asks Ethel about the
other voucher holders and learns that all
are women, seven are African American,
three are Latino, one is Asian, and one is
Caucasian-a breakdown roughly
reflecting the racial demographics of
voucher holders across our hypothetical
city.
To Cecilia the "no Section 8" policy,
though facially neutral, has a disparate
impact on women and minorities, and
the landlord may be required to accept
the voucher as part of its duty to accom-
modate disabled residents under the
Fair Housing Act. Courts had held so far
that a landlord's refusal to accept vouch-
er holders did not give rise to a claim of
disparate impact under the Act.7
However, a recent Ninth Circuit decision
seemed to renew hope for this type of
challenge.
8
Cecilia realizes that her office could file a
federal fair housing case to try to stop the
evictions. Aside from bankruptcy filings
and social security appeals, however, she
has not practiced in federal court, and
she took her federal courts class from a
professor who imparted little to her but a
sense of impending doom whenever she
heard the words "Rooker- Feldman."9
She now has only seven days to make a
series of quick decisions about how to
litigate Ethel's potential fair housing
claims. Should she plead a fair housing
claim as a counterclaim or affirmative
defense in the state eviction and risk the
rendering of a decision having res judi-
cata effect by an eviction judge who may
spend only minutes hearing Ethel's
claim? Should she file an administrative
complaint with the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), an independent state court suit,
or a federal case? Should she seek to
enjoin the eviction proceeding? She
knows enough about civil procedure to
understand that the consequence of
bringing, or in some cases failing to
bring, a claim may be to lose it forever.
Here I attempt to answer some of these
questions by examining the procedural
issues unique to the context of fair hous-
ing claims arising from a prospective,
pending, or former state court eviction
suit. First, I outline some of the general
legal and strategic considerations that an
attorney and her client should weigh in
deciding where and when to bring a fair
housing claim. Second, I examine the
preclusive effect of bringing or failing to
bring the claim as a counterclaim or
affirmative defense in a state court evic-
tion proceeding. And, third, I analyze
the effect of bringing a fair housing
claim in a federal court proceeding that
occurs contemporaneously with the
eviction or subsequent to the eviction,
with a focus upon the Anti-Injunction
Act and the federal abstention doctrines.
General Legal and Strategic
Considerations
A broad range of eviction scenarios may
implicate fair housing law. The data on
evictions are "sparse and uneven" and
yield little statistical evidence as to the
extent to which tenants raise fair hous-
ing defenses or, indeed, any defense at
7See Knapp v. Eagle Creek Apartments, 54 F3d 1272, 1280 (7th Cir 1995); Salute v Stratford Greens Garden
Apartments, 136 F3d 293, 302 (2d Cir. 1998)
8See Giebeler v. M&B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1153-55 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 2003) (holding that a landlords rejection of
a disabled tenant whose inability to work meant that he required a relative to assist him with paying rent violated the
Fair Housing Act duty to accommodate a disabled tenant).
9 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine taken from two Supreme Court cases provides that a district court may not review a
state court judgment See "Rooker-Feldman Abstention" in the main text
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all.1 0 However, the proliferation of pub-
lished decisions in which higher state
courts found such defenses to be germane
indicates that the issue arises with some
frequency.1 I do not intend to catalogue
the grounds for bringing a fair housing
claim or to explicate the legal nuances of
each such claim.Y2 In any fair housing case,
however, the predominant consideration
in decidingwhether and where to bring the
claim must be the strength of that claim. If
the fair housing claim is a weak (but still
colorable) one due to the applicable law,
credibility of witnesses, or relevant facts, it
can be an affirmative defense in the evic-
tion, but not worth "making a federal case
out of it."
The principal forums available to a fair
housing claimant include HUD's or
other similar state or local administra-
tive agencies' hearing process, the state
eviction proceeding, an independent
state suit, and federal court. Because the
HUD administrative process involves an
investigation of the complainant's alle-
gations, it is an opportunity to learn
more about the case. However, HUD may
be an impractical forum in cases where
tenants face imminent eviction.
The Fair Housing Act requires HUD to
complete its investigation of a complaint
within ioo days "unless it is impractica-
ble to do so."13 A study, however, shows
that HUD regularly takes much longer.
In the 2ooo fiscal year the average num-
ber of days from the time a complaint
was received to finding cause (allowing
the complaint to proceed to adjudication
by an administrative law judge or federal
litigation, depending upon the election
of the parties) was 497 days.' 4 After
conclusion of the investigation, howev-
er, the average time for resolution of
cases appears to be shorter in cases
adjudicated by a HUD administrative law
judge than those in federal district
court. 5
1 0 See Hartman & Robinson, supra note 1
11See infra note 19.
12 For an exposition of federal civil rights laws relevant to the fair housing context, see generally ROBERT G SCHWEMM,
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION (1990); JAMES A. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 
IN REAL ESTATE, COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT A DREVITALIZATION (2d ed. 1995); Florence Wagman Roisman, Housing, Poverty, and 
Racial Justice: How Civil
Rights Laws Can Redress the Housing Problems of Poor People, 36 CLEARINGHOUSE REV 21 (May-June 
2002).
1342 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(B)(iv) (2003).
1 4john Relman, Federal Fair Housing Enforcement at a Crossroads: The Clinton Legacy 
and the Challenges Ahead, in
CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RIGHTS AT RISK: EQUALITY IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 
99, 102 (2002).
1 5 See Michael H. Schill & Samantha Friedman, Ctr. for Real Estate & Urban Policy, N.Y. Univ Sch. of Law, Enforcing the
Fair Housing Act 60 (Aug. 15, 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with Schill) (finding 
that for the years 1997 and
1998 it took 313 days longer, on average, to resolve a suit in federal district court than 
in the U.S Department of
Housing and Urban Development).
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HUD does not have authority to enter
injunctive relief either. Rather, the Fair
Housing Act provides that, in cases
where "the Secretary concludes at any
time following the filing of a complaint
that prompt judicial action is necessary
to carry out the purposes of this sub-
chapter," the HUD secretary may direct
the U.S. attorney general to file suit for
injunctive relief in federal court.'
6
Both the Fair Housing Act and Section
1983 claims may be filed in state court,
and there may at times be good reasons
to do so.17 State judges or juries may be
more sympathetic, or state civil proce-
dure may be more favorable than federal
law. Indeed, the multitude of federal
procedural hurdles discussed here is a
compelling justification for considering
state court. However, civil rights attor-
neys have traditionally found very good
reasons to choose a federal forum, and
here I focus primarily on this scenario.
Not all states allow a defendant in an
eviction action to plead a discrimination
claim as an affirmative defense or coun-
terclaim. Because most states have cre-
ated a summary process for evictions,
many of them exclude all counterclaims,
or at least those counterclaims or affir-
mative defenses that are not considered
"germane" to the issue of possession. 18
Most states hold that a defense of dis-
crimination is germane to the underly-
ing purpose of the eviction action. 19 But
some states hold that discrimination
may be raised only as an affirmative
defense, and not as a counterclaim for
damages or for injunctive relief."
Other states, moreover, hold that a dis-
crimination defense may be germane to
some kinds of evictions, but not to oth-
ers, such as a case alleging nonpayment
of rent. 2 1
Some states have adopted compulsory
counterclaim rules similar to the one
used in federal courts. The federal rule
requires, in essence, that a counterclaim
be brought if it arises out of the "same
transaction or occurrence" as the oppos-
ing party's claim and if the holder of the
counterclaim serves a pleading on the
opposing party and has not already filed
the claim in another suit. 2 Where such
a rule is applicable, and a counterclaim
is not filed, the effect is the same as if it
had been brought and judgment entered
against the defendant; the claim may not
be brought in a future case.? 3 Thus, in a
state that considers fair housing claims
germane to evictions and has a compul-
sory counterclaim statute that it applies
to evictions, a tenant is required to file
the claim in the state eviction court if she
has not already filed elsewhere before
the deadline for answering. 4
1642 U.S.C. § 3610(e)(1) (2003).
17
5ee id. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (2003) (a Fair Housing Act claim may be filed in "an appropriate United States district court
or State court ..."); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990) (holding that Section 1983 claims filed in state court
must be heard there if that tribunal considers similar state law claims).
18See, e.g., Clore v. Fredman, 319 N.E.2d 18, 21 (111. 1974) ("Only matters germane to the distinctive purpose of
forcible entry and detainer proceedings may be introduced.").
19 See Josephinium Assocs. v. Skye Kahli, 45 P.3d 627, 632 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (cataloguing cases).
20 See, e-g-, Am Nat'l Bank v. Powell, 691 N E.2d 1162, 1170 (111. App, Ct. 1997) (holding that counterclaims see, g
money damages are not germane to forcible entry claims); Lincoln Square Apartments, Section I, Inc. v Davis, 58 Misc. 2d
292, 295 N.YS.2d 358, 361 (N Y Civ. Ct 1968) (holding that equitable relief to renew an expired lease based on a First
Amendment claim was unavailable in a summary proceeding), aff'd, 316 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. App. Term. 1969)
21 See, e.g., Fayyumi v City of Hickory Hills, 18 F Supp. 2d 909, 919-20 (N.D. III 1998) ("[T]he fact that the defen-
dants may have discriminated against the plaintiffs in the past was simply not germane to the fact that the plaintiffs
faded to pay their rent in a timely manner, failed to comply with the Landlord's Five Day Notice, and that the defen-
dants were, therefore, entitled to possession.").
2 2 Fed R Civ P 13(a) (2003). For a discussion of the state courts that have adopted a version of this rule, see Howard
M Enchson, Interjunsdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH, L. REv. 945, 977-78 (1998).
2 3
See Baker v Gold Seal Liquors Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974)
2 4 For a discussion of which states apply their compulsory counterclaim statute to evictions, see Kimberly E, O'Leary;
The Inadvisability of Applying Preclusive Doctnnes to Summary Evictions, 30 U. Toi L REv 49, 91-92 (1998).
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The issue of when the best time is for a
tenant with a defense based on fair
housing law to file a fair housing claim in
federal court is a particularly thorny one,
which I deal with in greater detail below.
The short answer, however, is that the
perfect moment is before the eviction
action is filed in state court. During this
fleeting, -enchanted" moment when a
case has ripened based on a landlord's
stated intent to sue, but the landlord has
not yet done so, courts have found few
procedural niceties about which to quib-
ble. That there are grounds for a federal
court to abstain in deference to state
adjudication is unlikely; there is no
claim or issue preclusion; and the Anti-
Injunction Act does not bar enjoining
the landlord from filing suit. ? 5
If the tenant waits a day too long, howev-
er, the complexity of her federal briefs
will grow exponentially. In cases where a
federal proceeding occurs contempora-
neously with a state court eviction, the
tenant may be forced to address the
Anti-Injunction Act, sundry forms of
federal abstention, and, if the tenant is
unable to enjoin the state proceeding,
possible preclusion as well. In a subse-
quent proceeding for damages, things
may be somewhat simpler (especially if
the tenant won the eviction case). Then a
tenant need cope only with potential
preclusion and the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine.!
6
In summary, for a tenant facing an evic-
tion against which there is a tenable
claim of discrimination, the most attrac-
tive forum is the state eviction proceed-
ing or an independent state or federal
suit. If the tenant chooses to file a feder-
al suit, the tenant will face procedural
hurdles if she files anytime after the fil-
ing of the eviction suit. In deciding
which course to pursue, a tenant and her
attorney should consider the relative
strength of the discrimination claim,
whether the claim is "germane" to the
issue of possession under state law and
whether the state has a compulsory
counterclaim rule. The attorney should
also weigh general considerations (e.g.,
the availability of discovery and trial by
jury, and jury demographics) involving
the relative attractiveness of the state
court compared to federal court. The
attorney needs to weigh two additional
factors: the likelihood that a state court
judgment may have preclusive effect
even if the tenant's claim is not brought;
and whether the state court proceeding
may be enjoined. These last two issues
are the subjects of "Preclusion" and
"Federal-State Comity," respectively.
Preclusion
The law of preclusion-the effect of a
decision rendered in one court upon a
subsequent proceeding-varies widely
from state to state. In the context of a
federal court confronted with a state
court eviction judgment, the court
should apply the preclusion law of the
rendering state.2 7 In other circum-
stances, the issue of which preclusion
law should apply is far less clear. Courts
struggled, for instance, with the ques-
tion of which preclusion law to apply to a
federal judgment entered in a diversity-
of-jurisdiction case. 2 8 Here I make no
attempt to survey these differences or
examine general principles comprehen-
sively.? 9 Rather, I present only the most
basic overview necessary for an advocate
to understand the issues at stake under
the narrow set of circumstances when an
2 5 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483 n.2 (1965).
2 6
See "Rooker-Feldman Abstention" in the main text.
2 7
See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Marrese v, Am. Acad of Orthopedic Surgeons,
470 U.S. 373 (1985); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S, 367 (1996)
2 8
5ee generally Ronan Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976), Stephen B. Burbank,
Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law. A General 
Approach, 71 CORNELL . REV.
733 (1986); Erichson, supra note 22.
2 9 For an explication of differences in state law on issues such as mutuality, finality, and nuances in the interpretation
of "same claim" and "on the merits," see Erichson, supra note 22, at 965-83 For 
a comprehensive examination of
general principles, see RESTATEMENT(SECONO) OF THE LAW § 1-42 (1982).
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eviction judgment has been entered
against a tenant who has filed or subse-
quently files a federal civil rights suit
against her landlord.
A tenant in such circumstances will like-
ly be precluded from raising her fair
housing claim where she had a full and
fair opportunity to raise the claim in the
eviction action even if she failed actually
to do so. Advocates whose states provide
eviction procedures that are procedural-
ly and substantively equivalent to those
afforded by federal law in a fair housing
suit thus need not absorb the nuances of
the following discussion; they must, in
short, plead their fair housing claims
within the eviction. Those with state
procedures that would prevent them
from receiving a full and fair hearing on
their claim, or from being awarded full
relief within the eviction, may find the
following discussion of interest.
The two principal forms of preclusion
are claim preclusion, or res judicata in
the traditional judicial lexicon, and issue
preclusion, or collateral estoppel. The
conventional statement of claim preclu-
sion is that a final, valid judgment ren-
dered on the merits is an absolute bar in
a subsequent action between the same
parties or those in privity with them
upon the same claim. Most modern
courts have adopted a broad definition of
"same claim' that encompasses all
actions arising from the same underly-
ing transaction. 3 ° At the time of judg-
ment, there is said to be "merger" of the
claim with the judgment, and further
action against the defendant must be on
the judgment and not the claim.
The rule of issue preclusion is that a final,
valid judgment on the merits is an estoppel
between the same parties or those in privi-
tywith them as to matters that were actual-
ly litigated and determined, even though
the claim in the subsequent action is dif-
ferent. In the case of both types of preclu-
sion, the underlying policy justification is
to assure finality where the parties had a
fair and full opportunity to litigate their
case. Commentators argue that there are
strong policy reasons not to apply preclu-
sive doctrines where the rendering court
was an eviction court, with summary pro-
cedures that are likely to hinder a tenant
from litigating all of her claims.
3 1
Nonetheless, eviction judgments are not
uncommonly found to preclude plain-
tiffs from bringing subsequent litigation
related to the question of possession. 3
Where the fair housing plaintiff actually
pled the fair housing claim in the evic-
tion suit as a counterclaim and lost, or
where she pled or argued it as an affir-
mative defense and lost, claim or issue
preclusion probably applies, respective-
ly.3 3 Where the claim was not brought,
but the landlord argues that the finding
that it was entitled to possession should
preclude the tenant from later claiming
that the landlord's termination of her
possession was discriminatory, the out-
come is much less clear.
Generally speaking, claim preclusion
will likely prevent the tenant from rais-
ing a fair housing claim that she could
have raised as a defense in the eviction,
even where she failed actually to raise
it.3 4 Where, however, the tenant is not
attacking the judgment but is seeking
relief independent of possession, such
as damages for discrimination in the
terms of her tenancy, the subsequent
claim may not be precluded. 3 5
3 0
Erichson, supra note 22, at 973-74.
3 1See O'Leary, supra note 24.
32 See, e.g., Ellis v Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 703 (Minn. 1982) (holding that plaintiff
was precluded from litigating the issue of discrimination, which he had raised as a defense in a prior eviction suit).
3 3
Where the defendant counterplaintiff prevailed on her claim, she may not be barred from bringing a subsequent
suit, if she seeks relief that was unavailable in the eviction court. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 21.
3 4
See id. § 22(b).
3 5
1d. But see Fayyumi v City of Hickory Hills, 18 F Supp. 2d 909, 920 n.8 (N.D. Ill, 1998) (holding that fair housing
suit for damages was precluded to the extent that it relied upon the discriminatory motivation of the defendants for
bringing a prior eviction action).
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In response to a motion to dismiss on
the basis of claim preclusion, the ten-
ant's strongest argument maybe that she
would have been unable to raise the
claim or would have been impaired in
doing so. Where the fair housing claim
would not have been considered ger-
mane in the eviction action, or the relief
sought would not have been obtainable,
the fair housing claim should not be pre-
cluded. 3 6 Where the state eviction court
procedures were severely truncated, the
tenant may also make a strong argument
against preclusion. Where states limit
discovery in eviction cases, mandate
quick dispositional timelines, dilute the
traditional rules of evidence, alter the
burdens of proof, or otherwise limit the
due process to which tenants are enti-
tled, the argument against preclusion
seems compelling.
More problematic are those states that
appear, on paper at least, to have, for
adjudicating eviction suits, a system that
allows tenants to plead defenses and
counterclaims broadly without limita-
tion on remedy, conduct discovery relat-
ed to them, and obtain a trial during
which they will not be subject to unrea-
sonable evidentiary burdens. In such
states the attorney should reconcile her-
self to litigating the fair housing claim in
the eviction because, whether or not she
pled the claim, any judgment entered
against her client will likely have preclu-
sive effect on subsequently filed fair
housing claims. 37
Federal-State Comity
Federal judges often blanch at the
prospect of hearing an eviction. As one
NewYork judge said in a case where a ten-
ant attempted to remove to federal court
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction:
The New York state courts are
filled with thousands of sum-
mary eviction proceedings. In
most of them the tenant seeks to
delay the process as long as pos-
sible. If we accept the removal of
these cases to federal court, we
will not only overburden the
federal system but will also
completely emasculate the state
structure for dealing with such
disputes.
3 8
Perhaps based on the logic of this
doomsday scenario, jurists have drawn
from a variety of doctrines based loosely
in theories of federal- state comity when
declining to decide a case involving an
eviction. The most pertinent of these
doctrines are catalogued and analyzed
here. Before beginning this discussion, I
should briefly note that one such doc-
trine is not discussed below-the doc-
trine of exclusive jurisdiction for cases
in rem or quasi in rem. I have not includ-
ed substantial discussion of this doc-
trine because its viability as a basis for a
federal court to withhold jurisdiction in
a fair housing suit concerning an evic-
tion appears doubtful. Courts historical-
ly have held that the first court to attach
jurisdiction over property must have
exclusive jurisdiction and that any other
suit concerning the property must be
dismissed or held in abeyance pending
the outcome of the first.39 Evictions
have been traditionally characterized as
in rem or quasi in rem.4 0 In cases where
federal courts have been asked to stay
preexisting evictions, however, they
appear to have ignored this doctrine of
3 6
See, e.g., Fayyumi, 18 F Supp. 2d at 919-20 (holding that an eviction judgment was not entirely res judicata as to a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3617 because under Illinois law the Section 3617 claim would not have been germane to a
nonpayment-of-rent case to the extent that it related to the retaliatory denial of services by the landlord); see
RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 26(c)(1).
3 7 A limited exception exists where the tenant can argue for some reason that the state court judgment is invalid See,
e.g., Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 561 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that judgment procured through fraud
does not have preclusive effect under Illinois law).
38
Glen 6 Assocs. v Oedaj, 770 F Supp. 225, 229 (S.D.N.Y 1991).
39See Penn Gen. Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 189, 195 (1935).
40See, e.g., Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1982); Pelletier v. Northbrook Garden Apartments, 210 S.E 2d
722 (Ga. 1974).
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exclusive jurisdiction or forsaken it in
favor of the highly manipulable balancing
tests of the various abstention doctrines.
4 1
The Anti-Injunction Act. The Anti-
Injunction Act deprives federal courts of
jurisdiction to "grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except
as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectu-
ate its judgments." 4 2
The U.S. Supreme Court has so far clear-
ly delineated only one statute that
"expressly authorizes" enjoining state
court proceedings: 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4
3
Although appellate courts found various
other statutes to meet the requirements
of the test set forth by the Court for
determining whether an injunction was
"expressly authorized," the First Circuit
held that the Fair Housing Act was not
one of these. 4 4 Unless the tenant can
show "state action" sufficient to bring
her civil rights claim under the guise of a
Section 1983 claim, she is unlikely to
meet the "expressly authorized" test. 4 5
The "protect or effectuate judgments"
exception is similarly unhelpful, having
been construed to apply only to issues
that have been fully and finally adjudi-
cated.4 6 Because it comes into play for
the most part under circumstances
where a state court is flouting an already
existing federal judgment, it is unlikely
to be relevant in the average fair housing
eviction scenario.
The "in aid of jurisdiction" exception
has been widely applied to in rem suits,
"where, to give effect to its jurisdiction,
the court must control the property."
4 7
(In contrast, courts have been reluctant
to enjoin a state proceeding based on the
"in aid of jurisdiction" exception where
both the federal and state cases are in
personam and involve the same subject
matter.)48 Under traditional principles,
the exception was applied with rigid
chronological logic to enjoin only later-
filed suits. In a sparse line of cases, how-
ever, courts have relied upon this excep-
tion to enjoin evictions, regardless of
when they were filed.4 9 These cases did
not focus upon the in rem nature of the
proceedings but relied instead on the
rationale that if the court did nothing,
the tenants would be evicted, and that it
appeared that the tenants would be
unable to raise their federal claims
effectively in state court. 5 0
41See, e.g., Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246, 251 (1946) (holding that under the Emergency Price Control Act a federal
court could enjoin, without addressing the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction, a state court eviction filed by a landlord
who did not want families with children); SEC v. Wenecke, 622 02d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980) (although assuming arguen-
do that evictions are quasi in rern, nonetheless holding that a state court eviction could be stayed); Sladek v Deplomb,
981 F Supp, 1364 (D. Colo. 1997) (applying the multifactor Colorado River abstention analysis in a case where tenants
filed a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against landlords who had filed an eviction
action against the tenants in state court).
4228 U.S.C. § 2283(2003).
4 3See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
44On statutes found to meet the expressly authorized test, see, e.g., Zajac v Fed. Land Bank, 887 F.2d 844, 855-56
(8th Cic 1989) (Agricultural Credit Act falls within the "expressly authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act),
rev'd en banc on other grounds, 909 F2d 1181 (1990), on the Fair Housing Act failing to meet the expressly author-
ized test, see Casa Marie Inc. v Superior Court of PR, 988 F.2d 252, 262 (1 st Cir. 1993).
4 5For a discussion of state action and action taken "under color of state law," see generally SHELDON NAHMOD, CML
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LTIGAVON THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 2 (4th ed. 2002).
4 6See Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F2d 527 (6th Cir 1978).
4 7See Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939).
48See Atl. Coast Line R.R Co. v Bhd of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S 281, 295-96 (1970)
49See Lattimore v. Northwest Coop. Homes Ass'n, No 90-0049, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3285 (D.D.C Mar, 26, 1990),
McNeil v. N.Y City Hous, Auth., 719 F Supp. 233, 256 (S.DN Y 1989), Caulder v, Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F2d 998,
1002 (4th Cir 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971) But see Camprubi-Soms v. Aranda, No 00 Civ 9626, 2001
U.S Dist. LE\I> 11291 (S D.N.Y. June 13, 2001) (Magistrate's Recommendation).
5 0
Lattimore v. Northwest Coop. Homes Ass'n, 1990 U.S Dist LEXIS 3285 at *14, McNeil, 719 F Supp at 255;
Caulder, 433 F2d at 1002.
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The "in aid of jurisdiction" logic also
lends itself to the generous language of
the All-Writs Act, which provides that
"[t]he Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of
law." 5 1 Sometimes viewed as an affirma-
tive grant of power to the courts, and at
others as an exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act, the All-Writs Act has
been cited as additional authority for
staying pending state cases in order to
protect a proposed settlement agree-
ment in federal class action litigation.52
The All-Writs Act has also been used
with increasing frequency to justify
removal of a state action that would
interfere with a federal judgment or
consent decree.5 3 Where a court is
deterred from relying on the "in aid of
jurisdiction" exception because of the in
personaam character of the federal action,
or because the state eviction was first
filed, the All-Writs Act could provide a
rationale for staying the state eviction.
Whether under the "in aid of jurisdic-
tion" exception or the All-Writs Act, the
argument for enjoining the eviction
remains the same. Just as with claim
preclusion, an advocate must point to
the state law barriers to effective litiga-
tion of the federal claim in state court.
"Younger" Abstention. As currently for-
mulated, the abstention doctrine of
Younger v. Harris should be inapplicable to
evictions, unless the government is a party
to the eviction suit.5 4 Nonetheless, the
doctrine has so expanded since its incep-
tion that its appearance in a defendant's
brief in a fair housing case is foreseeable.
In its original form, Younger required fed-
eral courts to withhold equitable relief to
avoid undue interference with a pending,
ongoing state criminal proceeding except
under "special circumstances," such as
prosecutorial bad faith or a blatant and fla-
grant unconstitutional construction. It has
since been applied to civil enforcement
proceedings and civil actions involving
certain orders uniquely in furtherance of
the state courts' ability to perform their
judicial functions.55 Such cases have typi-
cally been those in which the state is a party
to the state court litigation, and among the
factors analyzed by courts making a Younger
holding is a requirement that an important
state interest be implicated by the state
case. The Younger test in essence requires
federal courts to abstain from enjoining an
ongoing state judicial proceeding that
implicates important state interests where
there is an adequate opportunity in the
state proceedings to raise constitutional
challenges.5
6
Courts almost uniformly hold that there
is no important state interest in a wholly
private dispute between a landlord and a
tenant.57 Even in a case where one of the
parties was a public housing authority, a
state actor, the court held that the dis-
pute was like one between purely private
litigants.5 8 Where the state or local gov-
5128 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2003).
52
5ee In Re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 FR.D. 32, 37 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
53
See Joan Steinman, The Newest Frontier in Judicial Activism: Removal Under the All-Writs Act, 80 B.U.L. REV. 773
(2000).
5 4
Younger v. Harris, 401 US. 37 (1971).
5 5
See New Orleans Pub, Serv. Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989) (describing cases).
56
See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
57
See Camprubi-Soms v. Aranda, 00 C 9626, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11291, *22, n. 11 (S.DN.Y. June 13, 2001);
Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Sciences v. City of New York, 64 F Supp. 2d 184, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), Usher v Waters Ins. &
Realty Co., 438 F Supp. 1215, 1220 (W.D.N C 1977); Litteral v. Bach, 869 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir 1989). But see
Newell v. Rolling Hills Apartments, 134 F Supp. 2d 1026, 1036 (D. Iowa, 2002) (relying on precedent of questionable
value to find an important state interest in evictions),
5 8 McNeil, 719 F Supp. at 255, n.27. Cf. Owens v. Hous. Auth. of Stamford, 394 F Supp. 1267, 1270-71 (D. Conn.
1975) (holding that Younger abstention was inappropriate because the issues in the case primarily involved federal and
not state law); Skinner v. Boston Hous. Auth., 690 F Supp. 109, 110-11 (D. Mass. 1988) (same)
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ernment is truly a party in the pending
state proceeding, courts, however,
applied Younger abstention. 5 9
"Booker- Feldman" Abstention. Although
referred to as an abstention doctrine,
Rooker-Feldman is, in essence, a kind of
federal common-law preclusion. It pro-
vides that lower federal courts may not
exercise jurisdiction over claims that
would require them to review a final judg-
ment of a state court. 6 , Courts look to
"whether the injury alleged by the federal
plaintiff resulted from the state court judg-
ment itself or is distinct from that judg-
ment" or, in other words, whether the
injury is "inextricably intertwined" with
the state judgment. 1 In practice, the
Rooker-Feldman analysis seems to con-
dense, in federal suits concerning evic-
tions, to the same set of inquiries as those
relevant to preclusion. Where federal
claims would not have been available in an
eviction, courts find Rooker-Feldman inap-
plicable; where they could have been
brought or were brought, the courtsabstain.6 2
"Colorado River" Abstention. Advocates
might think of Colorado River abstention,
which provides that a federal court may,
under "exceptional circumstances," refuse
to decide a case in deference to a parallel
state proceeding, as a kind of preemptive
Rooker-Feldman abstention.6 3  While
Rooker-Feldman abstention allows a federal
court to abstain where there have beenfor-
mer state court proceedings in which judg-
ment has been entered, Colorado River
allows a court to abstain in deference to a
pending state proceeding. Underlying both
types of abstention is a conflation of
abstention doctrines with those of claim
and issue preclusion. In the case of
Colorado River abstention, it is a concern for
the possibility of preclusion, combined
with an interest in judicial economy moti-
vating the doctrine.64
Where a tenant can argue that the state
court action will not result in claim
preclusion, she should be able to avoid
Colorado River abstention. 6 5 Otherwise,
she will need to construct arguments
based on the multifactor test set forth by
the Court in Colorado River.
6 6
"Pullman" and "Burford" Abstention.
The Pullman abstention doctrine allows a
federal court to stay federal proceedings
until state resolution of unsettled matters
of state law that bear directly on the
case.67 The doctrine, as such, is likely to
come up in eviction cases only where ten-
ants challenge state eviction law itself as
being unconstitutional. In Troupe v.
Fairview Apartments, for instance, the
59 Columbia Basin Apartment Ass'n v. City of Pasco, 268 F3d 791 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Younger abstention
applied where the plaintiff landlords, landlord association, and tenants sought to enjoin an action filed by the city to
enforce its land-use ordinance)
6 0 See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); DC Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S, 462 (1983)
6 1Garry v. Geils, 82 F3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996).
62 Compare Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 558-60 (7th Cir, 1999) (holding that because an eviction
defendant would not have been able under Illinois law to raise claims for money damages under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act and Section 1983 in a forcible case, Rooker-Feldman did not bar her subsequently raised feder-
al claims), with Gerontis v. Schwartz, No. 98 Civ. 289, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39928 (S.D.N.Y Mar 31, 1999) (without
citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, holding that abstention was appropriate where a tenant had brought a Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act claim in an eviction, filed a postjudgment motion to reconsider, and removed to federal bank-
ruptcy court).
6 3 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v, United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
6 4
See Calvert Fire Ins. Co v, Am. Mut Reinsurance Co,, 600 F.2d 1228, 1229 n.1 (7th Cir. 1979) ("A suit is 'parallel'
when substantially the same parties are contemporaneously litigating substantially the same issues in another forum,
thus making it likely that judgment in one suit will have a res judicata effect on the other suit.").
65
See "Preclusion" in the main text. Cf. Sladek, 981 F. Supp. at 1364 (applying Colorado River abstention in a RICO
case filed by tenants where the court found that the state eviction court was able to decide the RICO claim).
66 The factors include the inconvenience of the federal forum, the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, and the
order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818,
6 7
Railroad Comm'n of Tex v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)
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court applied the Pullman abstention
doctrine to a case where subsidized ten-
ants sought to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the state eviction statute,
which did not require good cause for
eviction. The court found the tenants'
interpretation of the state law to be
questionable and ruled that "the state
courts should be given the opportunity to
interpret state statutory procedures so as
to comply with it."6 8 In such cases, ten-
ants can avoid a Pullman abstention rul-
ing by successfully arguing that the state
law is unambiguous and clearly improp-
er on its face.69 Where a federal court
abstains on Pullman grounds, the tenant
may reserve her claim for federal adju-
dication after conclusion of the state
proceeding if she does not submit the
federal claim to the state court and
explicitly notes her intention to reserve
it.70 She still runs the risk, however, of
issue preclusion.
Similar to the Pullman doctrine is the
still more amorphous Burford abstention
doctrine, which allows abstention in
cases presenting difficult state law ques-
tions that bear on policy issues of "pub-
lic import whose importance transcends
the result in the case then at bar."
7 1
Burford has given rise to far-reaching
progeny, which might make it an attrac-
tive precedential basis for abstention
from a fair housing case involving an
eviction.72
Although traditionally Burford absten-
tion was limited to cases that would
require interference with a state admin-
istrative proceeding or order, some
courts have extended it to cases where a
state regulatory scheme merely exists,
whether or not any proceeding is pend-
ing.73 Moreover, state courts have been
found to be an "administrative body" for
purposes of Burford abstention, at least
in cases where a judge arguably has an
administrative function, such as author-
izing an abortion in the absence of
parental consent.74
In jurisdictions that have an administra-
tive eviction scheme, Burford could be a
dangerous rationale for abstention.75
Even where the eviction proceeding is
judicial, the mutable logic of Burford
could still emerge, although Burford
abstention in such a case would seem
poorly supported by existing
precedent.7 6 Advocates can point, in
addition to other arguments against
Burford abstention, to the substantial
precedent from Younger suits holding
that landlord-tenant cases do not
involve an important state interest or, in
other words, that the eviction involves
6 8
Troupe v. Fairview Apartments, 464 F Supp. 234, 235 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); see also Columbia Basin Apartment Ass'n,
268 F.3d at 806 (staying federal case filed by tenants, landlords, and a landlord association until the parties had the
opportunity to litigate the validity of a land-use ordinance under Washington law in Washington state court).
6 9 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 62 (1972) (declining to abstain where eviction statute challenged as unconstitu-
tional was clear on its face, had been in effect for over 100 years, and had been substantially interpreted by courts).
7 0 England v. La. Sch. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
7 1
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814 (construing Burford v. Sun Oil Co, 319 U.S. 315 (1943)).
7 2See 1 A JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.203[2] (2d ed. 1996) (construing Alabama Public Service
Commission Railway Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951), and Kelly Services. Inc. v Johnson, 542 F2d 31 (7th Cir. 1976)).
7 3
See Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F3d 789 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding Burford abstention warranted in a case
filed under the Endangered Species Act concerning an aquifer in spite of the absence of any pending administrative
order or proceeding, and the fact that the "comprehensive regulatory scheme" was not fully in place), rehearing en
banc denied, 118 F.3d 1580 (5th Cir. 1997), and cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1089 (1998).
7 4
5ee Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 868 F.2d 459, 464 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting "a federal court's responsibility
to avoid usurping a state's authority to supervise its own administrative body, in this case the state judiciary as it imple-
ments regulations of minors' abortions").
7 5See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 201G-53 (2003) (granting the Housing and Community Development Corporation of
Hawaii the authority to conduct an administrative eviction hearing); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 201G-55 (2003) (granting the
aforementioned development corporation the authority to issue and enforce a writ of possession).
76 For a case that followed the logic of Burford, without citing it, see Glen 6 Assocs., 770 F Supp. at 228 ("the law of
landlord/tenant relations is strongly grounded in public policy...").
Clearinghouse REVIEW Journal of Poverty Law and Policy m November-December 2003
Unfair Evictions
no "questions of state law of substantial
public import."77
Conclusion
Federal litigation can be complex and
time-consuming. An attorney might
represent a dozen defendants in state
eviction court or undertake a substantial
community education project during the
time that it takes to brief the sole issue of
whether the federal court has jurisdic-
tion to hear a tenant's claim. Still, part of
the mission of legal services since
inception has been to bring to bear on
behalf of the poor "a full range of service
and advocacy tools-a range as full as that
offered by private attorneys for the afflu-
ent."78 If this ideal has survived, it is a
strong rationale for federal litigation,
which now, more than ever, is the modus
operandi of the very well-heeled.
(Because the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts does not maintain statis-
tics on the number of cases filed each
year in forina pauperis, comparing the
number of cases brought by the affluent
and those filed by the indigent is diffi-
cult. Clearly, however, the legal needs of
the poor go largely unmet, in part due to
the cost of obtaining representation, and
litigants are most likely to represent
themselves in state specialist courts
rather than federal court.)79
The abuse of summary eviction proce-
dures by landlords retaliating or dis-
criminating against their tenants is a
significant problem faced by the poor,
one that is efficiently obfuscated by the
volume of caseloads of eviction courts.
The occasional filing of a meritorious
federal suit challenging a discriminatory
eviction can highlight a systemic prob-
lem like this one. 8 ° Such litigation has
the potential to focus the attention of the
media, the public, and policymakers and
to mobilize clients to speak for them-
selves.
8 1
This is not to say that the ultimate goal of
fair housing litigation should be other
than to prevail on behalf of a client with
a concrete need, or that such success is
impossible. In spite of the procedural
nuances set out here, attorneys have
prevailed in federal cases where land-
lords attempted to use state eviction
proceedings in the service of malice,
prejudice, or callous ignorance. In cases
like these, filing a federal fair housing
suit may simply be the best way to pro-
tect a person's rights.
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7 7
See "Younger Abstention" in the main text and supra note 57.
7 8
Alan W. Houseman, Political Lessons. Legal Services for the Poor--a Commentary, 83 GEO. L.J 1669, 1684-85
(1995).
79 See Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts: Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME JL.
ETics & PUB. POLY 475, 481-84 (2002); Michael J. Sniffen, Poor Left Behind as Courts Go High-Tech, ASSOCLATED PRESS,
Oct. 11, 2003, www. washingtonpost.com.
8OThis is what Lucie E. White refers to as "law as a public conversation": "Even when it does not succeed, well-craft-
ed litigation can reveal the law systematically working to contain grievances. Litigants, by reformulating legal norms in
light of their intuitions and experience, can project visions that expand the range of social options." White, supra note
5, at 758.
8 1
1d. But see Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970) (arguing that traditional litiga-
tion-focused poverty lawyering does little but condition the poor to rely on lawyers rather than themselves).
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